Living with Ghosts by Snowden, John Rockwell
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 70 | Issue 3 Article 4
1991
Living with Ghosts
John Rockwell Snowden
University of Nebraska College of Law, jsnowden1@unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
John Rockwell Snowden, Living with Ghosts, 70 Neb. L. Rev. (1991)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol70/iss3/4
John Rockwell Snowden*
Living With Ghosts
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................................... 446
II. Law and Morality ......................................... 447
III. A Psychological Jurisprudence of Everyday Experience:
Som e Puzzles .............................................. 451
A. Reflection and Existence ............................. 451
B. Contradiction ......................................... 455
C. Dream s ................................................ 457
D. Morality and Law and Greed ......................... 459
IV. Conclusion ................................................. 460
I. INTRODUCTION
I want to do some jurisprudence. By that, I mean to talk about law
while not doing law. One talks while doing many things. There are, of
course, many ways to talk or write while doing law. For example, an
opinion letter, memo notes, opening or closing arguments, a brief, a
question at trial, a ruling on evidence, a statute, and a court opinion
are all commonly recognized manifestations of talk doing law. I will
not be doing law, but rather, I hope, jurisprudence. Thus, the truth of
the old adage, "Those who can do; those who can't teach."'
Jurisprudence talks and teaches about law. "What is law?" Now,
that is an old question with many answers from many quarters. Here
I will look to an old jurisprude, Leon Petrazycki, who was as late as
1976 described as, "almost unknown to the Anglo-Saxon and English-
speaking world ......"2 Of course, I never met this man. I found refer-
ence to his ideas in several articles by a colleague who was examining
law from a psychological view and suggesting that a psychological the-
ory of jurisprudence would do well to focus on the experience of law
in everyday life.3
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska
1. And, someone added, "And those who can't teach, teach teachers; and those who
can't teach teachers, teach law; and all the rest are lawyers."
2. Rudzinski, Petrazycki's Significance for Contemporary Legal and Moral Theory,
21 AM. J. OF JUPIS. 107 (1976).
3. Melton, The Significance of Law in the Everyday Lives of Children and Families,
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I want to talk about Petrazycki's notion of law so that all of us,
doers, teachers, and lawyers, might consider our relationship to law.
"What makes it go?" "How do I drive it?" I will tell you what Pe-
trazycki thinks law is. Then, I will attempt to take these ideas into
contemporary areas of jurisprudential thought by discussing a few cu-
rious puzzles that they raise. All of this is to offer-not prove-a way
of seeing law. It is, of course, only a way; an insight that may be ac-
cepted or rejected, though not erased. Perhaps it may stimulate
thought on where we have been and which way we might go.
II. LAW AND MORALITY
Leon Petrazycki was one of the early proponents of a psychological
jurisprudence. He was born in Poland in 1867 to a family that be-
longed to the Polish nobility.4 He studied medicine for several years
in Kiev and then turned to law. He developed an extensive body of
scholarship in Polish and Russian and two of his major works have
been put in an English translation, Law and Morality.5
Petrazycki was recognized as a brilliant law student at the Univer-
sity of Kiev and he was awarded a grant to study in Germany. He
studied for two years in Berlin at the time of the drafting of the Ger-
man Civil Code and published two works in German which drew wide
attention. When he returned to Russia he published a work under the
title "Introduction to the Science of Legal Policy" and on the strength
22 GA. L. REv. 851 (1988); Melton & Saks, The Law as an Instrument of Socializa-
tion and Social Structure in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION, THE LAW As
A BEHAvioRAL INsTRUmENT 235 (G. Melton ed. 1985).
4. G. Langrod & M. Vaughan, The Polish Psychological Theory of Law in POLISH
LAW THROUGHOUT THE AGES 299, 306 (W. Wagner ed. 1970). In this Article I use
the Polish spelling, "Petrazycki." The name is sometimes found as "Petrazhit-
sky" which is said to indicate the pronunciation. N. Timascheff, "Introduction"
LAw AND MORALITY: L. PETRAzYCKI AT xvii (H.W. Babb trans. 1955). It is also
found as "Petrazhitskii." Babb, Petrazhitskii Theory of Law, 18 B. U. L. REV. 511
(1938). Timascheff and Babb refer to Petrazycki as a Russian legal philosopher
while Langrod and Vaughan denote him as Polish.
5. L. PETRAZYCKI, LAW AND MORALITY: (H. Babb trans. Harv. Univ. Press ed. 1955)
[hereinafter LAw AND MORALITY]. The translation is abridged from two works,
THE INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAw AND MORALITY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
EMOTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (1905)(311 pages) and THE THEORY OF LAw AND STATE,
IN CONNECTION WITH A THEORY OF MORALITY (1907 )(758 pages). The translation
itself runs to only 330 pages.
It is said that the L. Petrazycki Association in Warsaw contains 35 volumes of
his work on 58 subjects. A short bibliography of his work in Russian and Polish
by English titles (although LAw AND MORALITY is the only English translation)
may be found in Sadurska, The Jurisprudence of Leon Petrazycki, 32 AIlv. J.
Jumis. 63 n.2 (1987). Other references to his works in Polish and/or Russian may
be found in the articles about his work which are cited in this Article. A bibliog-
raphy may be found in Babb, supra note 4, at 576-78 which refers to commentary
(in German and Russian) about Petrazycki's work.
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of that piece he was awarded a Master's Degree. In 1897 he received a
doctor's degree and was admitted to the professorship. In 1898 he pub-
lished two volumes in Russian, The Joint-Stock Company, and was
given the chair of philosophy of law at the University of St. Peters-
burg. He served on the faculty there for twenty years and was the
first elected dean.6
At St. Petersburg, Petrazycki, caused quite a stir. Some jurists
thought he was so radically shaking the legal structure that there
would be nothing left. He was soon the most talked about and well
known member of the law faculty. His classes were in the largest lec-
ture hall and over a thousand students, and others, overflowed its con-
fines. His annual income, based in part on attendance, reached the
unprecedented figure of 40,000 rubles.7 All this happened despite lin-
guistic difficulties and an "involved style, in German fashion."8
Petrazycki sought an empirically based understanding of law and
toward that end used an "experimental" methodology of introspection
and observation. He is called strongly antimetaphysical because he re-
jected the independent reality of all imagined verbal abstractions and
recognized only physical objects, living organisms, and psychic occur-
rences as genuine. 9 When Petrazycki observed the external world he
concluded that law like Zeus could not be found.lo But, observation
did discover a consciousness of our own mind and there law did ap-
pear. Petrazycki then applied an experimental method of self-obser-
vation; through introspection he observed the workings of his mind
and its relation to the external environment and with "inference by
analogy" extended his observations to others." Petrazycki thought
this to be empirical psychology without metaphysical or natural law
postulates.12 And, he did not compile empirical data; there are not any
numbers.13
Introspection and observation convinced Petrazycki that the mind
6. G. Langrod & M. Vaughan, supra note 4, at 307-11.
7. Babb, Petrazhitskii Science of Legal Policy and Theory of Law, 17 B. U. L. REV.
793, 795 (1937).
8. G. Langrod & M. Vaughan, supra note 4, at 311. "The saying went in St. Peters-
burg at the time that Petrazycki thought in Polish, mentally translated his
thought into German, and then spoke in Russian." Id at n.52.
9. Rudzinski, supra note 2, at 108-09.
10. LAw AND MORALITY, supra note 5, at 6-9.
11. Id- at 13-17.
12. Laserson, The Work of Leon Petrazhitskii: Inquiry into the Psychological As-
pects of the Nature of Law, 51 CoLuM. L. REV. 59, 65 (1951).
13. "He relied entirely on historical and legal material in documentary form, which
he handled with an extraordinary skill and erudition, and on introspection and
external psychological observation." Sadurska, supra ,dote 5, at 90. Perhaps it
was Petrazycki's numbers aversion which helped Professor Saks to say, "Law stu-
dents are typically smart people who do not like math." Saks, Legal Policy Anal-
ysis and Evaluation, 44 AM. PSYCH. 1110, 1115 (1989).
[Vol. 70:446
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has an active and a passive knowing. The active knowing, will (the
will to stay awake despite fatigue), is voluntary and directed toward its
object or goal. However, two passive modes of knowing, intelligence
and feeling, are not within the control of the person. Cognition forces
one to avoid sitting on the hot stove and a feeling of pleasure places
without consent a spark in the eyes. When a person knows in one or
the other of these modes, Petrazycki called this unilateral--one way
or direction at a time.14
Furthermore, self-observation revealed that there was a common
way of knowing that was bilateral. Bilateral knowing combines active
will and passive intelligence and/or feeling. Appetite is a specific bi-
lateral knowing with a passive feeling and an active will to actualize a
satisfaction by eating something. Many bilateral knowings are less
specific. Your friend suggests that you should go to a concert. Here
intelligence and/or feeling combine with will to attain actions which
are not of specific detail or even general character or direction. All
bilateral knowings are called impulsions by Petrazycki.1 5 It is impor-
tant to note that due to the combination of active and passive under-
standing impulsions are a way of knowing that is partly intended by
the actor and partly beyond the actor's control.
Whatever the source and wherever the seeding of impulsions,S bi-
lateral understandings, part active will and part passive intelligence
and/or feeling are the roots of morality and law. Impulsions might
cause an imperative experience of duty, "I must give gifts." This expe-
rience for Petrazycki was morality. Impulsions might also cause an
experience that is of imperative duty and attributive right, "I must
give the pipe to Mary." This experience, a psychic phenomenon,
which may or may not be acted out in the external world is law.17
Petrazycki thus identified morality and law in psychic experiences
of bilateral understanding, impulsions formed partly by intent and
partly by fate. Morality he distinguished as ungrounded duty to which
no person has a claim, while law anchors the imperative impulse to an
attributive right of, towards, or in relation to another. The law experi-
ence of the subject might be either as holder of right against another
or obligor of duty to another. In either case there is a subject which
imagines another. Law is the experience of human beings imagining
themselves and others to have rights and duties. Such law exper-
14. LAw AND MORALiTY, supra note 5, at 22-23.
15. I& at 22-31; G. Langrod and M. Vaughan, supra note 4, at 354-58. Sadurska, supra
note 5, at 66-68.
16. Petrazycki does not surmise the origin or source of impulsions. Rudzinski, supra
note 2, at 118.
17. LAW AND MORALrY, supra note 5, at 45-49, 62; Babb, supra note 4, at 513-17;
Rudzinski, supra note 2, at 111-12. See also Sorokin, Book Review, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1150, 1152-53 (1956)(reviewing LAW AND MORALrrY).
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iences direct action and nourish sentiment.'8
Petrazycki's focus on law as psychic experience greatly broadens
the concept of law.' 9 Law as impulsion experience sharply contrasts
with the view that identifies law as constitution, statute, or common
law. These absolute universals were for Petrazycki fantasy or "phan-
tasmata," ghosts.20 Law is an experience in human beings, similar to
dealing with flatulence in a haunted house. It is not the ghosts that do
it.
When Petrazycki turned from naming the ghosts (civil law, com-
mon law, family law, criminal law) to identifying the phenomena of
observation and introspection, law broke the boundaries of ideology.
He described four types of law. All share the base of impulsion cre-
ated experience of duty and right in the human mind. Positive law is a
duty-right experience that refers to a normative fact.21 The normative
fact is not necessarily a statute or common law rule. It might be any
fact called to mind which evokes a legal experience, e.g., a holy book, a
constitution, a ritual dance, or a promise.22 Put another way, a statute
is not the law; a statute is a normative fact that when called to con-
sciousness sometimes triggers a legal impulsion in some people's
minds. In the structure of legal experience a constitutional conven-
tion stands on the same ground as might a parent's good night kiss,
"That good night kiss really has my attention. I should kiss someone
good night. I must kiss my child good night."
When the legal experience does not refer to some normative fact,
this is intuitive law.23 When the human being experiencing law is an
official of the state acting in such a capacity then that is official law.
Unofficial law is experienced by a person not acting as a state official.
Official or unofficial law experiences may be either positive or
intuitive.24
Law suddenly is everywhere. Games of all kinds are arenas for law
experience. Family relations of every stripe yield law experiences as
hands are washed or not and toys are returned to brother or sister.
18. For Petrazycki, law had both a distributive and organizational function. Babb,
supra note 4, at 557-61. These functions were carried out by motivation and edu-
cation. Id at 562-66. But, it is clear that all of this is in your head. Petrazycki
rejected the command and sanctions theory of law. Rudzinski, supra note 2, at
113-15.
19. Rudzinski, supra note 2, at 109, 117-18.
20. LAW AND MORALiTY, supra note 5, at 41-42, 62.
21. Id- at 57.
22. Id. at 157-58, 161-64; Babb, supra note 4, at 566-67.
23. LAW AND MORAIXrY, supra note 5, at 57; Babb, supra note 4, at 567-570. Given the
wide potential for normative (legal impulsion triggering) facts it might be
doubted that there are any truly "intuitive" law experiences. Indeed, Babb, in
the portion cited above says that intuitive law may be supplemented by "rele-
vant" but not normative facts. The distinction seems illusive.
24. LAw AND MORALrrY at 139-40.
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Manners and etiquette may take on a right-duty character. The so-
called criminal gang is rife with law, and religious notions of impera-
tive-attributive character are legal experiences.25 "Law is a psychic
phenomenon."26 And, like rain it falls where it will.
Petrazycki's notion of what is may be found in Law and Morality.
And, the scholars who have been able to have access to his works in
Russian and Polish leave a clear consensus as to what he thought the
point of it all was--"the complete dominance of active love."27 In his
work on the German Civil Code Petrazycki criticized the drafters for
overlooking love.28 "The great, bright ideal of the future," said Pe-
trazycki, was love.2 9 For Petrazycki this was an axiom of practical
reason not derived from experience or a generalization of observable
data.30
In Russia at the beginnings of the Twentieth Century Petrazycki's
ideas caused considerable discussion.S1 Late Twentieth Century
American jurisprudence is also in considerable ferment.32 Today,
legal scholars have called attention to many problem areas once
thought beyond a narrow view of law. I want to take Petrazycki's ex-
panded notion of law and ask how it might inform or be informed by
several puzzles that are raised today. The puzzles will not be solved.
Yet, their mystery and their gifts might be better understood.
III. A PSYCHOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF EVERYDAY
EXPERIENCE: SOME PUZZLES33
A. Reflection and Existence
The problem of reflection and existence is tied to method and sub-
25. Rudzinski, supra note 2, at 117-18.
26. Babb, supra note 4, at 518.
27. Babb, supra note 7, at 810. When the "'psyche of love"' kicks in law will be
"psychologically inappropriate." I&.
28. G. Langrod & M. Vaughan, supra note 4, at 317.
29. Rudzinski, supra note 2, at 123.
30. Sadurska, supra note 5, at 74.
31. Timascheff tells of the exchange of articles and pamphlets that provoked Pe-
trazycki to write a small book, THE NEW DOCrRINE OF LAW AND ITS CRaMCIIs BY
SERGUEYEVICH (1910) in response to "vicious attacks." N. Timascheff, supra note
4, at xxix.
Some 20 years later Jerome Frank's psychological approach in LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND (1930) set off a similar storm.
32. See Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980's, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599
(1989).
33. The relationship of reflection and existence runs throughout the work of
Professor Roberto Mangabeira Unger. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
(1975); R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY (1976); R. UNGER, PASSION: AN
ESSAY ON PERsONALITY (1984). The particular notion of contexts of routine and
contexts of transformation is articulated in R. UNGER, FALSE NEcEssrrY 4 (1987).
Discussion of the fundamental contradiction is usually attributed in
1991]
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ject as subject and method are themselves entwined. We act from two
distinct and seemingly irreconcilable knowings. On the one hand, we
act as if we are the passive receptors of the world; the context of our
existence, the institutions, thoughts, materials, and images simply
given. Logic and causality open the window only to what is. On the
other hand, we act as if the world may be made as we desire. The
dreams of what might be call us to create a fresh context that appears
foolishly to insult reason and fact. The context of knowing may not be
shed, but whether it is an existence to be endured or a reflection to be
turned is answered in the taste of the action that knowledge yields.
The relation of reflection and existence is of much interest in cur-
rent jurisprudence. A strong voice in that concern, Professor Roberto
Unger, has continually focused his thought on the problem of the con-
textual frameworks in which law occurs. He has discussed the appar-
ently passive frameworks of routinization and the frameworks which
contemporary works to Professor Duncan Kennedy. See Kennedy, The Structure
of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 211-12 (1979). The
contradiction of rules and standards has been a focus of Professor Mark Kelman.
See M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987). An extensive
bibliography of stories, narrative, and its connection to law may be found in
Elkins, A Bibliography of Narrative, 40 J. LEGAL ED. 203 (1990). Powerful
examples of narrative jurisprudence have been produced by Marie Ashe, a
Nebraska law graduate who now teaches at the University of West Virginia
College of Law and Emily Hartigan who currently teaches at the University of
Nebraska College of Law. See Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web:
Thoughts on "Reproduction" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. J. 355 (1989); Hartigan, The
Power of Language Beyond Words: Law as Invitation, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV.
67 (1991).
Professor Peter Gabel has written the classic piece on dreams or illusions as
factors that block authentic human confrontation by a dialogue of "rights." See
Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984). The dream of living by what we
would do and feel in each other's circumstances has been offered by Professor
Leonard Jaffee. See Jaffee, Empathetic Adjustment-An Alternative to Rules,
Policies, and Politics, 58 U. CINCINNATI L. REv. 1161 (1990). Much of feminist
thought views "law" as a patriarchal myth. See generally Scales, The Emergence
of Feminist Jurisprudence" An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1378 (1986).
Judge Richard Posner discusses every traditional and current demand for an
autonomous and objectively correct "law" in his recent book, The Problems of
Jurisprudence. He concludes that effort by rejecting every such claim and
issuing a "pragmatist manifesto." R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
454-69 (1990).
The story of Leon Petrazycki is retold from the works already cited. That
part of the story which tells of the dinner party and the delicious homemade
cakes may be found in Meyendorff, The Tragedy of Modern Jurisprudence, in
INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ROSCOE POUND 521 (P. Sayre ed. 1947). The closing words from Leon Petrazycki
are found in LAw AND MORALITY at 70-71.
All references to the Montgomery Bus Boycott come from the scholarship of
Professor Randall Kennedy. See Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution:
A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989).
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seem to be actively revised in transgression. He has sought to illumine
the question of how and why we pass from one framework, logic, or
consciousness to another.
By dividing the world into matters of law and matters of fact
through the forms of legal rights and the procedures of courts, the
commonly understood legal process plays a significant role in the
maintenance of routine or the quest of transformation. For example,
consider the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955. Dr. Martin Luther
King was prosecuted for breach of a statute prohibiting conspiring
"without a just cause or legal excuse" to hinder, delay, or prevent an-
other from carrying on any lawful business.
The situation called a myriad of legal ghosts, legal rights, to mind.
And, it was these ghosts that were thought to provide an authoritative
answer to questions of the proper order and marshalling of the facts.
Would the law of evidence allow testimony of persons who were riding
busses that were struck by rocks or bullets to be heard when those
persons had not seen the source of the attacks? Would the racist be-
havior of the Montgomery City Lines be relevant to the law's question
regarding the "just cause" of the boycott? Was the boycott's commit-
ment to non-violence relevant to the law as a "legal excuse"? Was
King denied the law's promise of due process by being selectively pros-
ecuted? What about the law's promise of free speech?
Although Dr. King was convicted by the logic of routinization,
somehow a logic of transformation became a conviction. In a few
years there were "Freedom Riders." But, before those facts took place
the law had asked other questions. Could the bus company ignore
state segregation rules? Could the informal transportation system de-
veloped by the boycotters be ordered to stop by a court? Was segrega-
tion on busses unconstitutional?
I do not know how a framework of routine oppression became a
framework for "Freedom Riders" and transformation. When is it time
to kill the King? Perhaps the only answer to the riddle is in the doing,
kiss the ring or strike the blow. Petrazycki's insight is that the doing
is common in the everyday experiences of morality and law. The bi-
lateral experience of impulsion is the mysterious source of legal expe-
rience. Impulsion is the coming together of active reflection and
passive existence. Thus, the particular knowing of a duty and right
experience is partly made-up and partly unavoidable. But, the legal
experience, the impulsion experience of reception and creation, is
inexorable.
All human beings have law experiences. "Give me my comic book
back." All of these experiences are from Petrazycki's perspective
identical and unique, like fire. Persons in all parts of the world are
becoming aware of their bondage to context and their simultaneous
ability to revolutionize it. Often, this awareness is due to, or enhanced
1991]
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by, a law experience where one realizes that what was once thought
necessary is to some extent open to transformation. This is the nature
of the law experience and like the wind it is everywhere.
The Law Is A Hollow Vessel;
Inexhaustible In Its Uses, Fathomless.
Lao Tzu
Leon Petrazycki was born in Poland, Vitebsk province. The people
of the province were predominately White Russian. Leon was born to
Polish nobility, the local gentry. But, four years before his birth, his
father, Jozef Petrazycki, had participated in an insurrection against
Russian rule. Jozef 's estates were confiscated and he died while Leon
was very young. Although Leon lectured in Russian at St. Petersburg,
he spoke with a noticeable Polish accent. His early works published in
German were signed "von" Petrazycki.
In 1906 while holding the office of dean with the law faculty at St.
Petersburg, Leon was urged to participate directly in political life. He
was elected to the Duma. Within the year the Duma was dissolved.
Former deputies and others joined together to produce the Viborg
Manifesto as a protest against the destruction of the Duma. The mani-
festo urged that the people not pay taxes which had not been adopted
by the Duma. The manifesto called upon the people to refuse military
service. And, finally, it asked that all other public obligations be de-
nied until the creation of a new parliamentary assembly.
Leon was not persuaded of the correctness of the manifesto. And,
he was aware of the consequences which would visit its signers. Yet,
he signed in a spirit of solidarity. He was sentenced to, and served,
three months in jail for this. He also lost his position as dean and was
demoted to an associate professor, although he returned to the faculty
after being released from prison.
In 1908 the president of the university, at the direction of the min-
ister of education, asked Petrazycki to sign a secret written document
stating that Petrazycki was not participating and would not participate
in any actions against the state. He was also to promise that he would
not breach any penal law, civil service regulations, or oath to the
crown. If he refused to sign, he was to be dismissed.
Leon said, "No." He refused to make any promises even in relation
to future acts. His written response stated that his views were in his
writing and public actions. As a scholar he claimed a right to be free
from governmental coercion while being nevertheless bound to re-
main impartial, objective, and detached from politics in his lectures.
Finally, political ethics and personal dignity were said to prevent him
from promising not to attempt change in the forms of government.
Several weeks later, the ministry of education, through the presi-
dent, replied to Petrazycki, that a civil servant was not free to criticize
his minister and that the government's distrust was justified by his
[Vol. 70:446
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criminal convictions. Finally, the language used by Leon was said to
be inappropriate.
Nothing happened. In 1913 Leon Petrazycki was restored to his
full professorship and re-elected dean by a vote of ten to one.
B. Contradiction
If the method of knowing is puzzling because of the tension of re-
flection and existence, it is also the case that the subject to be known
is contradictory. Law is the personal experience of duty and simulta-
neous right. This experience is marked by contradiction. Look by in-
trospection and observation at this psychic experience in which you
imagine another to be in a relation of right holder or duty obligor to
you. This other may, of course, be sitting in the room with you or be
itself a creature of imagination sitting nowhere, yet acting upon you
through human agents who don its skins.
This other is the source of contradiction. I need others to be fully
alive and an authentic self; but while I yearn for them I fear that they
may smother me. Professor Duncan Kennedy has called this "the fun-
damental contradiction." This root paradox (a paradoxical world
seems less frightening than a world of contradiction) is manifested in
every law experience.
Mark Kelman gave expression to this contradiction's presence in
the very linguistic form of legal ghosts, rules and standards. Rules
(Do not use guns to take things from others) direct that we live with
others so that good fences make good neighbors. But, a clear fence
will invariably be over or under inclusive in some instances. And, by
reliance on rule one surrenders to the cunning who will turn the
rule's edges to swords. Thus, one turns to a form that articulates a
standard (Do not take things from others in ways that are not reason-
able.) Yet, to live with others by the standards of honor one will en-
counter caprice and must suffer the tyranny of shameful surrender or
guilty rebellion.
The contradictions of need and threat in relation to others and of
rule or standard in the shape of the ghosts is magnified by the possibil-
ity that every ghost, or at least many, have a twin. A statute prohibit-
ing free expression is not allowed. Yet, a statute may prohibit free
expression if there is a beautiful enough (compelling re political
speech, substantial re commercial speech, and legitimate re porno-
graphic speech) state interest and its clothes are properly fit (nar-
rowly tailored in the case of political and commercial speech, and
rationally related for pornographic speech). The problem of the twins
might be seen in Petrazycki's notion of the normative fact.
Remember that the active-passive knowing (impulsion) of an im-
perative-attributive experience, law; may be positive or intuitive. Pos-
itive law is a law experience triggered by or moored to a normative
1991)
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fact. Intuitive law is not tightly woven to such a fact. Yet, how could
one experience a right-duty knowing without some context, facts. If,
as Petrazycki says, a story of the origin of the Sacred Bear is as enti-
tled to normative fact status as a story of legislative process, then how
does one know an intuitive law experience and its context of relevant
fact from a positive law experience within a context with normative
fact.
This problem may seem trivial, law is law, and its type of little im-
port. However, the answer to the problem seems to occur in every
contradictory or paradoxical law experience. In that case it may in-
form all of law. Introspection and observation suggest that we deal
with contradiction by a narrative method of remembering and telling
stories. It is the story; perhaps a movie, a song, an account of a friend,
one's life foretold, or Ex parte Crow Dog, that one turns to as answer-
ing the navigational problems of a paradoxical experience. First, in
the beginning, is the story. The story brings the normative facts of
positive law to the surface. It is the story that leaps into the void of
intuitive law. In story everything is up for grabs.
Law experiences surrounding the Montgomery Bus Boycott and
the trial of Dr. Martin Luther King for conspiring to harm the bus
company were of course full of contradiction. I believed that the con-
spirators had a just cause. The ghosts said guilty while I said honora-
ble. And, I thought I heard some ghosts that agreed with my law
experience. They continue to speak.
Within the criminal trial itself Dr. King may have lied. He claimed
he had not conspired to urge others not to ride the buses. Perhaps this
was done to protect others. Perhaps the truth was not something that
could be demanded by oppressors. But, perhaps the true narrative of
resistance if told at the trial would have caused the story of struggle to
become a more powerful normative fact.
Perhaps the shift from routine to transformation would have been
more visible; its vibrations heard more clearly.
Half Vie Story Has
Never Been Told
Robert Nesta Marley, O.M.
Leon Petrazycki was the son of a noble and the son of a rebel. In
his mature life he signed a manifesto of resistance with which he sub-
stantively disagreed as an expression of solidarity. And, to protect his
freedom, he refused to sign a promise of intellectual indenture. He
was a prisoner of the state and a dean of the law school.
In 1917, Leon was again dean at St. Petersburg. The provisional
government that was formed after the revolution of 1917 appointed
him to the Senate, Russia's Supreme Court. He was apparently
thought of as a person of progressive opinion. It was believed that he
favored equal rights for women and he was well known as a humanist.
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However, due to a pessimistic view of the revolution and current
events, he never participated as a jurist with the court.
In 1921 persons of Polish ancestry were given the opportunity to
emigrate to Poland. Leon left. He took a chair of sociology in the Law
Faculty of Warsaw University. In Poland, he worked also with the
Polish Committee for Codification in spite of illness during this pe-
riod, and the reactionary government of Marshal Pilsudski. In his last
year on the faculty he fought in defense (the offense is not mentioned)
of an eminent Jewish historian.
He professed an empirical method of introspection and observation
that sought to reject all metaphysical ghosts. Yet, he saw the domi-
nance of active love as the goal of law experiences. Law experience,
like a psychic infection of reason and desire was to make itself inap-
propriate in the presence of love. Yet, love was postulated as "practi-
cal," beyond introspection and observation.
On May 15, 1931, experiencing the law of library participation,
Leon, sent his wife to the library to exchange a book for him. When
she returned he was dead. The revolver was by his side.
C. Dreams
The law is overlooked when sought only in phantoms such as con-
stitutions and statutes. Such phantoms neither direct nor nourish the
people, for the energy is in the person not the ghost. The person is
filled with the tension of reflection and existence. It is that pressure
which sings the melodies of self and other. The ghosts are flat, they
have no life in them and they mask the lives that they haunt by sooth-
ing the fear of confrontation with real and imagined others.
Discourse in ghost language binds the people in chains which are
not less strong because they are fantasy projections. The ghost of
"conspiracy" holds a human being in subordination while the specter
of "just cause" holds the key. The most powerful idol "belief in au-
thority" tricks all human beings into alienation. "Authority," as seen
by Professor Peter Gabel, is a ghost which one turns to when one no
longer believes that others ALSO desire to relate in a way that is life-
affirming and empowering. Thus, one becomes alienated; he or she
acts toward the other as if some ghost lieutenant of "Authority" will
mediate a confrontation.
All the rules and standards, the ghosts of law, attempt to give a
ghost appearance to the human beings they fear. A person is seen as a
"landlord" or "tenant." And, the ghost of "lease" flattens the context
of the obligation to pay money to another for living in a particular
place and the right to demand money for having shared with another.
The ghost of "Authority" known to the necromancers of law as
"rights," hides from us the place, the understanding, and the doing of
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law. Good people may at least hope to share sovereignty and perhaps
to take dominion.
Professor Leonard Jaffee has argued that all systems of law are
pathological, that they mirror and breed warped characters. Warped
character reflects chronic repression, denial, and harm that has oc-
curred in the person's history of pursuing simple biological and spiri-
tual pleasure and attempting to avoid pain and suffering. Warpage
results from the creation of patterns of perception, desire, and action
that limit the internal freedom of persons to a role and/or type. The
types are myriad and vary greatly in scope and intensity; e.g., respecta-
bility, attention to detail, sophistication, craftsmanship, godliness,
emotionless action, steely nerve, and phallic narcissism. The roles are
also many; parent, student, lawyer, and poet are just a few. But, a
pathological character is not necessarily doomed to evil or hopeless-
ness. There is always some potential for free unblocked sensibility.
Because few, no matter how warped, are completely without empa-
thy, Professor Jaffee suggests that we dismantle every system; not
draw a line somewhere, but erase one. Try empathic adjustment to
deal with others; rely on empathy. Everyone has some empathy, at
least enough for a hope that we could do law by what we would feel
and do in each other's situation. Empathy does not have a ghost sys-
tem to protect us, nor a demon to tell us our shame is justice. As a
first step, tell the people that they may let the guilty go free. After all,
there is no Nuremberg Defense and the empathy which saves the
criminal may also save the judge.
At the trial of Dr. Martin Luther King those who dared to judge
another would not sort the good and the bad by rules, but do the
things that are right. The law experience would be a way for the peo-
ple to confront their character. They would define themselves by gov-
erning as they would do and feel in each other's circumstances andimagination. What ghost can threaten a strong heart or heal the
weak?
Love Is The Only
Law To Obey.
David "Ziggy" Marley
One night Leon Petrazycki gave an excellent dinner party in his
small dining-room. Prince Eugen Trubetskoy, a Professor of Philoso-
phy of Law at Kiev University was in attendance. Senator Foynitsky,
an eminent criminologist at St. Petersburg was there. The woman
who prepared and served the chickens (Backhuhm), the piece de
resistance and special choice of Leon, who was an expert host, was the
mother of several of Leon's children. She (unnamed in the story) and
the children lived in the flat with Leon. They were not married. The
guests may not have suspected that the lady was not Leon's landlady.
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But, no one seemed to care. The evening was a delight for thought
and taste. Trubetskoy was brilliant in his quiet way.
When Petrazycki was about fifty he married another woman. She
(unnamed in the story) was the widow of Leon's publisher, Martynou.
She was a Polish lady and no longer young, but very practical and full
of attention for Leon's incessantly working intellect. Shortly before
or after this marriage Leon provided for his children. (The story does
not tell us what happened to their mother.) His wife was also a good
cook, she made delicious cakes. She exchanged Leon's library book
for him. Later, she found his body.
D. Morality and Law and Greed
Petrazycki thought that an impulsion (active and passive knowing)
experience of obligation or duty without an identifiable right-holder
was morality. And he distinguished an impulsion experience of law as
having an identifiable holder of right; that is, the experience has both
a duty-obligor and a right-obligee. There is, however, another impul-
sion experience that appears to introspection and observation. An im-
pulsion experience that focuses only on rights, what is owed by the
unspecified world at large to isolated majesty, is greed. The exclusive
focus on the right to the results of gravity, energy, and matter, without
the experience of duty to the earth and stars, destroys the environ-
ment with greed. An obsessive desire for the right of wealth max-
imization and efficiency, without a concern for the poor and inept,
fouls the lives of human beings with greed.
In jurisprudential thought, greed manifests itself as the compulsive
claim that law is an autonomous disciplihe and that its self-contained
methodology will produce correct answers that persons from the most
different political or value perspectives will come to accept as objec-
tively true. Judge Richard Posner has exposed the impossibility of
this claim and, taking a line from Yeats, states frankly that for the
greedy or the not-so-greedy, "there's more enterprise/In walking na-
ked." To begin that enterprise Judge Posner, issues a "manifesto":
1. There is no such thing as "legal reasoning,"
2. It is usually impossible to demonstrate that a legal decision is correct;
3. Difficult cases can only be decided reasonably;
4. Large changes in law occur as often from conversion or vision as from
intellect;
5. Law is an activity that accepts an infinite range of arguments;
6. Law often has a text in the picture, but the meaning of that text is always
up for grabs;
7. Law has no overarching concepts of justice, that can direct its actions; and
8. Law is strictly functional, caring not for the soul or the mind, but only
behavior.
Eighty years after Petrazycki's ideas shook up St. Petersburg,
Judge Posner states that the law has above all an attitude problem.
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The pious and reverential must give way to the inquiring and chal-
lenging. Thus, although Petrazycki and Posner disagree on whether
or not law battles for consciousness; they concur that legal experience
should be gauged by its temper and consequences in the material
world.
But, Posner still believes that law is an experience of only the few.
For Posner, law is the activity of licensed professionals called judges.
These judges make law from statutes and decisions and their own
preferences. They are limited only by a vague sense of professional
propriety and moral consensus.
Petrazycki, on the other hand, saw law experience as common and
endemic to all human beings. Perhaps the most important law experi-
ence of my lifetime was that of Rosa Parks, who refused to move from
her seat on the Montgomery Lines bus. Although three people on
either side of Rosa Parks moved as ordered by the bus driver to ac-
commodate several white passengers; Rosa Parks did not. Rosa Parks
asked the police officers who boarded the bus and demanded that she
move, "Why do you push us around?" One of the officers replied, "I
don't know, but the law is the law, and you are under arrest." Rosa
Park's law experience did not demand a right answer from an autono-
mous legal doctrine. Her confrontation with a real other through an
impulsion experience of duty and right made law in the real world.
Her life experience gave the lie to the ghost language of "all deliberate
speed."
If All Things Were To Become Smoke
The Nostrils Would Distinguish Them
Heracitus
People will distinguish right and wrong, and the edge of judgment
is sharpened by experience. Petrazycki's experiences of introspection
and observation led him to see law as a phenomenon of everyday life.
A passage from Law and Morality pointedly tells us that this experi-
ence may not be ignored.
If in the home the attitude to the child is that everything is permitted to
the child with regard to others, and the child's demands of every kind are
carried out unquestioningly, the result is an anomalous legal mind which may
be characterized as a hypertrophy of the active legal mentality: the subject
becomes possessed of a propensity to ascribe to himself with reference to
others innumerable unreasoning and inordinate legal powers and legal claims,
while at the same time acknowledging no rights in behalf of others. The ab-
normally developed legal mind elevates the child into a sort of being privi-
leged among mortals. If, on the contrary, the child is neglected as regards the
law-if no rights of any kind (not even the most modest) are acknowledged in
his behalf and no active law sphere of any sort is assigned to him-the reverse
psychic anomaly then ensues: underdevelopment of the active law mentality.
IV. CONCLUSION
Law may be seen several different ways. What one finds is related
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to intention and perspective. Your desire and your standpoint is just
that, yours. And each of us must cry for our own vision. In this crying
the voices of others, and the voices of ghosts, remind us that we are
everywhere.
